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Abstract: 
The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of how local public in-kind benefits affect the 
distribution of income in Norway. To this end, a method that accounts for differences between 
municipalities in capacity to produce the same standard of public services is used for assessing the 
value of sector-specific local public services in each municipality. Moreover, recipient frequencies in 
various demographic groups are used as basis for determining the allocation of the assessed value of 
services on citizens of the municipalities. The empirical results show that inequality in the (marginal) 
distribution of municipal in-kind benefits is rather high. The contribution of municipal in-kind benefits 
to inequality in the distribution of extended income (cash (after-tax) income plus municipal in-kind 
benefits) proves, however, to be approximately neutral. 
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1. Introduction 
 Most studies of income distribution focus exclusively on cash income and ignore the 
value of public services, although important services like education and health care in many countries 
are publicly provided for redistributive purposes. As suggested by Smeeding et al. (1993) this practice 
may be due to the fact that “the problems inherent in the measurement, valuation, and imputation of 
non-cash income to individual households on the basis of micro data files are formidable.” Moreover, 
in most countries the scope for dealing with these problems is constrained by data limitations. As will 
be demonstrated in this paper the data limitations are less severe in countries that have established 
extensive register data systems. This is one reason why Norway emerges as an attractive country for 
studying the measurement of benefits from public services. A second reason is that Norway has a 
relatively large public sector where the municipalities are supposed to play a key role in the provision 
of public services. To this end the central government has introduced an equalization program for 
municipalities that aims at providing municipalities with equal opportunities to produce the same 
standard of public services. However, since the central government also makes transfers to 
municipalities for other purposes, mainly for regional development, the production opportunities may 
vary across municipalities. Moreover, local governments may exhibit different spending behavior that 
may result in different priorities over different services and over different households and individuals. 
For instance, some municipalities may give priority to education and childcare services whereas others 
may focus on care for the elderly and disabled. Thus, it is far from clear that the program for 
equalization payments reduces the inequality in the distribution of income in Norway. 
 The purpose of this paper is to provide an evaluation of the effect of municipal in-kind 
benefits on the distribution of extended income among individuals living in Norway, where extended 
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income is defined as the sum of private income after tax and the value of municipal services received 
by the household/individual. To this end, it is required to assess the value of local public services and 
allocate the actual amounts on households and individuals. To deal with the former problem we 
employ a method that accounts for differences between municipalities in capacity to produce the same 
standard of public services. The proposed valuation method, discussed in Section 2, is derived from a 
model of spending behavior of local governments, where spending on different services is specified as 
a function of economic, social, demographic and geographic variables. By accounting for variation in 
unit costs in the valuation of sector-specific municipal services, the distribution of public spending 
across heterogeneous municipalities is converted into a distribution of adjusted expenditures that is 
comparable across municipalities. Next, the valued and comparable municipal in-kind benefits have to 
be allocated on recipients. Section 3 deals with this problem by allowing for different treatment of 
services, depending on the justification of the service in question. Services like health care, social care 
and care for the elderly and disabled may be considered to serve as insurance for certain 
subpopulations or the entire population. For these services methods that for each municipality allocate 
the value of the public service on potential recipients are introduced. By contrast, the value of the 
production of education and childcare is allocated uniformly on the families that receive these 
services. Section 4 deals with the distribution of extended income and the interaction between private 
incomes and the value of local public in-kind benefit. Section 5 provides a sensitivity analysis, where 
the empirical results based on the valuation method introduced in this paper is compared with results 
produced on the basis of the standard government cost approach. A brief conclusion is given in 
Section 6. 
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2. The value of local government services 
 The standard approach in studies of the distribution of public services is to assume that 
the value of services equals the expenditures in service production (Ruggles and O'Higgins, 1981; 
Gemmell, 1985; Smeeding et al., 1993; Ruggeri et al., 1994). This means that in-kind transfers are 
treated similarly as cash transfers when this income component is added to private incomes in analyses 
of the distribution of extended income. Thus, this approach does not account for differences between 
municipalities in costs to produce a given set of public services. Since differences in costs of attaining 
minimum standards for various services affect the municipalities' capacity to produce a given package 
of local public services for a given income level, the standard approach may produce misleading 
results. 
 As demonstrated by Aaberge and Langørgen (2003b) the linear expenditure system (LES) 
provides a helpful basis for estimating municipal-specific costs of attaining minimum standards of 
various services. The municipal expenditure data are then assumed to be generated from a model 
specified as a linear expenditure system with eight service sectors 
(1) 
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where ui is per capita expenditure1 on service sector i, y is per capita exogenous income of the local 
government,2 the parameter  is called "subsistence expenditure", the parameter iα iβ  is the marginal 
budget share, and  is the random term for service sector i.iε
3 Subsistence expenditures are defined to 
be the product of unit costs and subsistence output. To identify variation in unit costs, we assume that 
unit costs vary as functions of observable characteristics. For instance, unit costs for some of the 
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municipal services are assumed to depend on whether or not the municipality is densely populated. 
Moreover, subsistence output is assumed to be affected by variables that describe the structure of 
demand or needs in the local population. For instance, subsistence output in primary education is 
supposed to increase with the population share of children in school age. While variation in unit costs 
implies that output is not directly affected, we assume that the subsistence output factors affect output, 
but not unit costs. Thus, the idea is that variation in unit costs is identified if we interpret the 
explanatory variables either as affecting unit costs or output. Although these assumptions appear to be 
rather restrictive, the method is less restrictive than the standard approach, which ignores a possible 
variation in unit costs and presupposes that the introduced explanatory variables exclusively affect 
output. A more flexible modeling framework is obtained by allowing for the following parameter 
heterogeneity 
(2)   ,8,...,2,1i,i =+=α i2i2i1i1 zαzα
where zi1 is a vector of variables that affect unit costs in service sector i, zi2 is a vector of variables that 
affect subsistence output in service sector i, and  and  are vectors of estimated parameters. The 
estimation results are reported in Aaberge and Langørgen (2003b). The parameter estimates prove to 
be consistent with the conventional wisdom of how the variables affect the expenditure profiles. The 
model includes the following service sectors 
i1α i2α
1. Administration 
2. Education 
3. Childcare 
4. Health care 
5. Social services 
6. Care for the elderly and disabled 
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7. Culture 
8. Infrastructure 
 For a detailed discussion of the variables that affect subsistence expenditures in different 
service sectors, we refer to Aaberge and Langørgen (2003b).4 Note that the majority of the exogenous 
variables are also included as compensation criteria in the Norwegian cost-equalization formula for 
intergovernmental grants. However, there are important differences between our LES model and the 
cost-equalization formula of the national grant system, which first and foremost are due to the fact that 
the cost-equalization formula is derived from a mixture of estimated partial regression models, data 
from recipient surveys and normative models. By contrast, the LES approach provides a simultaneous 
treatment of the service sectors where exogenous variables are shown to affect expenditure in all 
service sectors. Moreover, the set of exogenous variables that have been tested in the LES model is 
more extensive than the set of variables that is included in the partial models used for the cost-
equalization formula.5  
 In a more extensive analysis of local government spending behavior, several additional 
variables have been examined. However, these variables have been excluded from the model since 
they proved to have no significant effects on the expenditure. For instance, in contrast to the results in 
the U.S. literature there is no evidence that poverty raises the cost of educational output in Norway.  
 The variables that explain the variation in unit costs and subsistence output in different 
service sectors are displayed in Table 1. The estimated per capita subsistence expenditures in most 
service sectors are decreasing as a function of population size. This result is interpreted as evidence of 
economies of scale, which means that unit costs are higher in smaller municipalities. One important 
reason for variation in productivity is that smaller municipalities use a larger share of their economic 
resources on administration in most of the service sectors, including central administration (sector 1). 
This relationship is captured by an index for small municipalities6 and the variable "inverse population 
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size". For social services, however, the index for small municipalities is assumed to affect output and 
not unit costs, since a large part of social services are cash transfers (social assistance), and the value 
of output is consequently defined by expenditure. The explanatory variables in sector 5 are therefore 
assumed to affect output and not unit costs. For this reason variables like the share of unemployed, 
divorced and foreigners from remote cultures are assigned to the output category. 
 
Place Table 1 here 
 
 Local government infrastructure services (sector 8) in Norway include sewage disposal 
and snow clearing. Local variation in the requirements for sewage purification derives from national 
environmental regulations, and is assumed to affect unit costs in sewage disposal. Furthermore, the 
unit costs for keeping roads open are assumed to increase with the amount of snowfall during the year. 
 Higher dispersion of the local settlement pattern is found to increase subsistence 
expenditures in education, health care and care for the elderly and disabled. We assume that these 
effects are due to variation in unit costs. For instance, school and class sizes tend to be smaller in 
sparsely populated school districts, and this is interpreted as reduced productivity. In care for the 
elderly and disabled the traveling time of the staff between client homes decreases with density, which 
implies higher unit costs in sparsely populated areas. By contrast, the estimated positive relationship 
between municipal expenditures on culture and population density is interpreted as higher supply and 
output in urban areas. Due to higher unit costs the observed local government expenditures are likely 
to overestimate the value of services in small and sparsely populated municipalities as compared to 
large and densely populated municipalities. 
 As Smeeding et al. (1993) we regard output in health related services as an insurance 
benefit, which is received independently of the actual use of services. Public provision is thus 
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compared to the alternative where citizens buy private insurance in the market. In this case output 
increases as a function of risk and coverage. Risk is described by the probabilities that residents with 
different characteristics become recipients, and coverage is described by the service standards that 
different types of clients can expect to receive. Since elderly people have a higher probability to 
become recipients of health related services than younger people, output is higher for elderly people 
(given the level of coverage). Thus it follows that the age structure affects output in health related 
services, which justifies the inclusion of these explanatory variables in subsistence output. For similar 
reasons the age structure affects subsistence output in childcare and education as well. 
 The population share of mentally disabled is a variable that includes actual recipients 
rather than potential recipients. Local government expenditure increases with the number of mentally 
disabled because this group is entitled to municipal care. The distribution of mentally disabled on 
municipalities is partly explained by the fact that some of the municipalities have been appointed as 
host communities for the mentally disabled. Thus, a high observed share of mentally disabled does not 
mean that the corresponding local environment produces a high risk of becoming mentally disabled. If 
we assume that the number of mentally disabled affects subsistence output, it follows that total output 
and welfare in the local community increase with the number of mentally disabled. By assuming that 
the number of mentally disabled affects unit costs the referred potential bias does not arise. The basic 
argument for this assumption is that the distribution of mentally disabled across municipalities is not 
related to the risk of becoming mentally disabled. 
 The above discussion suggests the following valuation of services in sector i 
(3) ,8,...,2,1i,)y(u ii
*
i =ε+α−β++= i2i2i1i1 zαzα   
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where  is the value of services in sector i, and *iu i1z  is the weighted average of the variables that 
affect unit costs.7 From equations (1) - (3) it follows that the value of local government service 
production in sector i equals 
(4) 8,...,2,1i),(uu i
*
i =−−= i1i1i1 zzα .  
 Thus, in assessing the value of sector-specific services, observed expenditures are 
adjusted for the difference between estimated unit costs and average unit costs. In municipalities 
where unit costs exceed (fall below) the mean unit costs, the value of services is found to be below 
(above) the observed expenditures. This implies, for instance, that the imputed value of services for 
small and sparsely populated municipalities tends to be lower than the observed expenditure, and vice 
versa for large and densely populated municipalities. Equation (4) captures variation in the output that 
can be supplied for a given budget due to different local production possibilities. 
 In addition to the adjustment for variables that affect unit costs, expenditures are also 
adjusted for variation in the employers' social security tax rate, which is regionally differentiated in 
Norway. The value of services is computed for an average value of the tax rate. Moreover, the value of 
municipal in-kind benefits is calculated exclusive of user fees. The value of services produced by 
county governments (the intermediate level of government in Norway) and central government is not 
included in the analysis. Thus, since the capital city Oslo is both a county government and a local 
government, we have estimated the share of expenditures in Oslo which is allocated to local 
government services. 
 The valuation of total service production in different municipalities is reported in Table 2. 
Note that the total value of services is assumed to be equal to the total expenditures for the entire local 
government sector. However, the estimated value of services for a given municipality may exceed or 
fall below the municipality’s expenditures, depending on whether the municipality has low or high 
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unit costs. Table 2 shows that the valuation falls below the expenditure for small municipalities, 
whereas the valuation exceeds the expenditure for large municipalities. Note that the national average 
falls below 100 percent simply because municipalities with different population sizes are given equal 
weights, which means that weights per capita are higher in smaller municipalities. Valued services 
vary between 66.8 percent and 114.4 percent of expenditures. 
 
Place Table 2 here 
 
 The results in Table 2 demonstrate that there are large differences between the observed 
and the assessed valuation of expenditures on the municipal level. However, as can be observed from 
columns two and six in Table 3 the differences between observed and assessed valuation of sector-
specific expenditures almost vanish when we aggregate expenditures and values of municipal services 
across municipalities. This issue will be further explored in Section 5. 
 
Place Table 3 here 
 
 Education and care for the elderly and disabled are the dominating service sectors and 
make up on average more than half of the total expenditure. Moreover, as can be observed from Table 
3 there is significant variation in the level of per capita in-kind transfers across municipalities. 
However, in order to explore the influence of differences in per capita in-kind transfers across 
municipalities on the distribution of (extended) income, it is required to allocate the assessed values of 
sector-specific public services in each municipality on its inhabitants. 
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3. Methods for allocating in-kind benefits on individuals 
 The analysis in this paper relies on 1998 data for 4.4 million individuals, 2 million 
families and 435 municipalities. The allocation of municipal in-kind benefits and user fees on families 
and individuals is based on six different data sources: 
• Local government accounts that provide sector-specific expenditures and fees at the munici-
pality level 
• Demographic, social and geographic characteristics, which affect the subsistence expenditures 
of the municipalities and hence the valuation of services 
• Number of recipients of different services in each municipality by age and gender 
• Prices in kindergartens and care for the elderly and disabled reported by municipalities. Prices 
are reported for different family income levels 
• Register information on age, sex, family type, municipality, education level and private in-
comes for individuals (and families) 
• Data from sample surveys that provide information on the use of public services for individu-
als and families 
 The allocation of in-kind transfers on families and individuals is made stepwise in the 
following order: 
1. Selection of the recipients of different services 
2. Allocation of municipal in-kind benefits on the recipients 
3. Aggregation of in-kind benefits within each family 
4. Choice of family equivalence scales for different services 
5. Allocation of equivalent in-kind transfers on family members 
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 The two first steps differ between service sectors, and are discussed separately for each 
service sector in the Appendix. The first step concerns identification of recipients while the second 
step determines the allocation of the value of municipal services on recipients. Specific subgroups of 
the population are the target of some services. We use two different methods to identify such 
subgroups. The first method is direct identification from available data. Although this method may 
yield the highest possible level of precision, the data required for exact identification of recipients is 
normally not available for public services. However, primary education represents an important 
exception since primary schools are compulsory, which means that the subgroup of recipients is 
almost identical to the population in the age-group 6-15 years. Age serves in this case as a key variable 
for identifying the recipients. 
 When there is no option for direct identification of recipients our strategy is to use 
available micro data as basis for estimating the probability of being recipient as a function of 
demographic and socioeconomic variables. When the population subgroups are defined by criteria that 
are relevant for the distributional policy of local governments, it is possible to approximate the 
distribution of services by random drawing of the correct number of recipients in each subgroup and 
for each municipality. Although the identity of the actual recipients is not revealed by this procedure, 
the method captures important features of the distribution of municipal services. Thus, to the extent 
that relevant characteristics of the recipients are taken into account, we are able to provide fairly 
precise approximations of the distributional profiles of these services. 
 For some services, like health care and social care, we rely on the risk-related insurance 
benefit approach of Smeeding et al. (1993) by adopting the view that health care is an insurance 
benefit received by all coverees, independently of the actual use of services. However, the probability 
of receiving benefits is allowed to vary by age, gender and family type in line with differences in need. 
By contrast, allocating the value of health care on the actual recipients makes less sense, simply 
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because the ill and disabled then will appear to have rather high welfare compared to those who are in 
good health. To be meaningful this approach would require that the direct welfare loss associated with 
illness and disability be taken into account. 
 When the recipients have been selected by simulation, the value of services is distributed 
uniformly among the selected recipients. For instance, we do not account for different opening hours 
and staying time in kindergartens. Moreover, demand for culture is assumed to be constant for a given 
education level. However, when services are allocated according to the insurance benefit approach, 
which applies to health care, social care and care for the elderly and disabled, we assume that benefits 
are distributed in proportion to the probability of being recipient. Thus, differences in allocated in-kind 
transfers across persons may either arise from variation in the probability of being recipient, or from 
variation in the economic situation and service sector priorities across local governments. 
 
Place Table 4 here 
 
 The allocation method for the municipal in-kind benefits combines the estimated 
probabilities of being recipient with the assumption of a uniform distribution on selected recipients or 
on potential recipients with common characteristics. In administration, culture and infrastructure the 
probability of being recipient is equal to 1 for all citizens, while the probability varies with individual 
characteristics for all other services.8 The characteristics that are included in the analysis for eight 
different service sectors are displayed in Table 4. We refer to the Appendix for further details on the 
methods that have been used for selecting recipients and distributing the value of services in different 
service sectors. 
 Aggregating benefits over family members constitutes the third step of the analysis, 
whereas the fourth step concerns the choice of family equivalence scales for different services. Family 
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equivalence scales are designed to adjust for differences in income needs for families of different sizes 
and composition, and thereby make incomes comparable across individuals. By adjusting each 
family's income by its equivalence scale, the distribution of incomes across heterogeneous families is 
converted into a distribution of (equivalent) incomes across individuals. To this end we will employ 
the class of equivalence scales introduced by Buhman et al. (1988) defined by Sa where S is the size of 
the family and a is the elasticity of the scale rate. To make incomes comparable the total income for 
each family is divided by the scale rate Sa. Buhman et al. found that a wide range of scales in use, 
including the OECD scale, can be summarized quite well by this parametric family. The parameter a 
can take different values between 0 and 1. The value a=1 means that there are no economies of scale, 
while the value a=0 signifies the maximum degree of economies of scale, where the scale is constant 
and independent of the family size. Smeeding et al. (1993) assume that there are no economies of 
scale in non-cash income (in-kind transfers), and consequently specify a=1. Their study includes 
services like education, health care and housing. This assumption is common in most analyses of the 
incidence of government expenditure, although the choice of equivalence scale is rarely discussed. 
 It is plausible to assume that the services provided by local governments in Norway are 
private goods on the family level, but some of the services exhibit economies of scale within families. 
We assume that social services, care for the elderly and disabled and infrastructure exhibit economies 
of scale. All other services are treated as private goods within the family. For instance, cultural 
services like subsidies for sports activities are consumed individually by the family members and not 
shared within the family. By contrast, family members share the benefits from social services like 
child protection and alcohol abuse protection. If a father is violent or abusing alcohol, and if he is 
cured by treatment, it is plausible to assume that the benefits are larger the larger is the family, simply 
because there are more persons to benefit. Therefore, we assume that social services are shared as a 
public good within families, so a=0 for this sector. 
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 Care for the elderly and disabled includes nursing and assistance in household work. 
While the individual recipient consumes nursing, assistance in household work yields benefits, which 
are consumed in common by family members. For instance, if a public employee cleans the home, all 
household members derive a direct benefit. The benefit of each family member from having the home 
cleaned is not affected by the number of family members. Thus, care for the elderly and disabled is a 
mixture of private and public goods. Consequently we have chosen an intermediate value for the scale 
parameter, a=0.5. 
 Infrastructure services include public roads, housing, water supply, and sewage and 
refuse collection. All these services are consumed commonly within the household. For instance, 
given the connection to water pipes, the marginal cost (and marginal user fee) for water in Norway is 
zero. Thus all household members may consume as much as they like, so the number of family 
members does not affect the benefit per person. Thus, we assume that infrastructure is shared as a 
public good within families, so a=0 for this sector. 
 The standard approach in analyses of the personal income distribution is to assume that 
incomes are equally distributed within households or families. This assumption is simply a 
consequence of sparse information on the internal distribution of consumption within families. In the 
case of in-kind benefits, however, we know the primary recipients of each family. An alternative to in-
kind transfers is to purchase similar services in the private market or to include them as part of the 
household production. For instance, parents may benefit from a reduction in household work when 
children are taken care of in kindergartens. Thus, it doesn’t seem plausible to assume that the primary 
recipients are the only beneficiaries. Therefore we apply the standard assumption of equal distribution 
within families in the fifth step. 
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4. Inequality in the distribution of extended income 
 Detailed results for the marginal distribution of municipal in-kind benefits are reported by 
Aaberge and Langørgen (2003a). The major finding is that total in-kind benefits are relatively low in 
the age-group 16-66 years, which is largely due to the fact that the basic local government services are 
primarily reserved for children and elderly. As a consequence the inequality in the marginal 
distribution of municipal in-kind benefits proves to be relatively high, with a Gini-coefficient equal to 
0.393. This result is due to high inequality in the distributions of in-kind benefits within municipalities, 
whereas the inequality between municipalities is low. The largest service sectors (education, childcare 
and care for the elderly and disabled) are disequalizing and explain the high level of inequality in the 
distribution of municipal services. 
 The indicated large inequality in the distribution of in-kind benefits is not necessarily in 
conflict with equalization policies that utilize local public in-kind transfers to redistribute welfare from 
rich to poor families. To discuss this issue the relationship between in-kind benefits and private 
incomes has to be taken into account. Thus it is helpful to introduce the term extended income, defined 
as private income after taxes plus the value of municipal services. To allocate private family incomes 
on individuals we rely on standard practice and assume that incomes are equally distributed within 
families. To account for scale economies in private incomes we follow Atkinson et al. (1995) and use 
the square root scale. The summary information for the distribution of extended income in Table 5 
shows that the mean extended income is increasing with municipality size. Moreover, inequality in the 
distribution of extended income is increasing with municipality size. 
 
Place Table 5 here 
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 Table 6 provides a decomposition of the mean value of individual (equivalent) extended 
income with respect to private incomes and municipal in-kind benefits, where municipal in-kind 
benefits are defined as the (equivalent) value of municipal services minus user fees. After-tax private 
incomes include market incomes and cash transfers minus taxes. The mean values of the income 
components are reported for various family types and age groups. The results of Table 6 show that 
singles and elderly earn relatively low after-tax private incomes, and that elderly 80 years and above 
receive high in-kind benefits. Persons in the age group 16-66 years have the highest average extended 
income due to high private income. Singles with children have lower private incomes and receive 
higher in-kind benefits than couples with children. 
 
Place Table 6 here 
 
 To get a better understanding of the relationship between the distributions of private 
incomes and public in-kind transfers, it is useful to decompose the inequality in the distribution of 
extended income with respect to income components. Extended income is defined by the sum of 
income components 
(5) ,  
s
i
i 1
X X
=
=
where X is extended income and Xi is component i and s is the number of income components. Note 
that subscripts for person are suppressed in equation (5). As demonstrated by Rao (1969) the Gini-
coefficient (G) admits the following decomposition 
(6) 
s s
i
i
i 1 i 1
G v (G)
= =
μ
= = iγμ  ,  
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where μμ /i  is the ratio between the means of Xi and X respectively, which is denoted the income 
share of component i. The concentration coefficient iγ  can be interpreted as the conditional Gini-
coefficient of component i given the rank order in extended income (X). The product of the income 
share and the concentration component is denoted the inequality contribution vi(G). Note that the 
concentration component iγ  can be considered as a measure of interaction between Xi and X. Assume 
for example that 0i >μ . Then a negative value of iγ  expresses negative interaction, which means that 
component i gives an equalizing contribution to total inequality. A positive value of iγ  expresses 
positive interaction, which means that component i gives a disequalizing contribution to total 
inequality. The case where 0=iγ  corresponds to a situation where every person receives an equal 
amount of component i. Thus, in this case the contribution to overall inequality from component i is 
said to be neutral. 
 By recognizing the multidimensional character of the decomposition problem, the 
decomposition method defined in equation (6) provides a simultaneous treatment of the income 
components in question.  Thus, the v-s provide information of the contributions from the various 
income components to the observed overall income inequality. However, when attention is turned to 
the effect of a marginal change in an income component (given that the other income components are 
kept fixed) it is as proposed by Lerman and Yitzhaki (1985) appropriate to consider the Gini elasticity 
defined by 
(7) logG = 1 , 1,2,..., .
log
i i
i
i
G
μ γ
μμ
∂  
− = ∂   s         
 The decomposition method defined in equation (6) will be used to decompose inequality 
in the distribution of extended income with respect to market income, social assistance, cash transfers, 
taxes, municipal user fees and the value of municipal services.  Market income includes salary, income 
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from self-employment and capital income. Social assistance is separated from other public cash 
transfers, since local governments grant social assistance, while other cash transfers in Norway are 
provided by the central government. Municipal user fees are treated similarly as taxes, which means 
that municipal services as a component of extended income include services that are financed by user 
fees. The results from the decomposition are displayed in Table 7. 
 
Place Table 7 here 
 
 Market incomes show to be the dominating income component with a clear disequalizing 
effect on the distribution of extended income. Since taxes are a negative income component, it follows 
from the positive concentration coefficient that taxes provide an equalizing contribution. The 
contributions from social assistance and central government cash transfers are also equalizing. Due to 
a higher income share the equalizing contribution is substantially higher for central government cash 
transfers than for social assistance. Inequality contributions that are close to zero indicate that user fees 
and municipal services have a neutral effect on the distribution of income, which means that the effect 
is similar to that obtained by an equal cash transfer to all citizens (corrected for economies of scale 
within families). Although we find large inequality in the marginal distribution of municipal in-kind 
benefits, the contribution from municipal in-kind benefits to inequality in the distribution of extended 
income is weakly equalizing or approximately neutral. However, by considering the effect of one per 
cent increase in the value of municipal services we find by inserting the relevant figures from Tables 5 
and 7 in equation (7) that the Gini coefficient for the distribution of extended income will decrease by 
0.16 per cent, provided that the concentration coefficients are not affected by the marginal change in 
municipal services. 
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 The tax component in Table 7 includes income taxes that are collected by municipalities 
to finance local government services, as well as taxes collected by counties and the central 
government. The main sources for financing local government services in Norway are 
intergovernmental grants, income taxes, property taxes and user fees. Thus, it is of interest to study the 
net contribution from local public expenditures, taxes and user fees to the inequality in the distribution 
of extended income. The tax record data allow us to allocate municipal income taxes on families and 
individuals. Municipal property taxes are not subtracted in the definition of extended income, since 
property taxes are not reported in the tax records. Property taxes in Norway account for only 2,3 
percent of total municipal expenditures. Thus, this component has solely a minor impact on the 
spending behavior of local governments. 
 Table 8 reports the net contribution to income inequality from local public services, 
which takes into account the allocation of valued services as well as the allocation of income taxes and 
user fees on families and individuals. Note that the income component "in-kind benefits exclusive of 
municipal income-taxes" does solely account for 3.8 per cent of the extended income. Thus, the large 
negative concentration coefficient for this income component explains why local government 
spending and financing jointly provides a substantial equalizing contribution to overall inequality. By 
combining the information provided by Tables 7 and 8 we find that this result is first and foremost due 
to the strong equalizing contribution from municipal income taxes. 
 
Place Tables 8 and 9 here 
 
 Private disposable income is defined to be the sum of market incomes, social assistance 
and national cash transfers minus taxes and municipal user fees. The last component in Table 7 is 
municipal services, which can be further subdivided into components that represent different service 
 20 
 
 
sectors. Decomposition of the inequality in the distribution of extended income by total private 
disposable income and eight municipal service sectors is displayed in Table 9. The purpose is to 
provide information on the interaction between extended income and the value of various municipal 
services. We find that the contributions from social services and care for the elderly and disabled are 
weakly equalizing, whereas the contributions from the remaining municipal service sectors are 
approximately neutral. However, as can be observed by inserting the estimated concentration 
coefficients and income shares from Table 9 in equation (7), the effect on inequality of a marginal 
change in the expenditure on care for the elderly and disabled is significantly stronger than the effect 
of a marginal change in the expenditure on social services despite the fact that the concentration 
coefficient for social services is more than four times as large as the concentration coefficient for the 
sector "care for the elderly and disabled". Moreover, note that the sector-specific contributions to 
inequality in the distribution of extended income are rather different from the various sector-specific 
contributions to inequality in the marginal distribution of in-kind transfers.9 
 To provide more detailed information of the decomposition of the inequality in the 
distribution of extended income, mean values of different income components by decile are reported 
in Table 10. Extended income in the seventh column equals the sum of the six income components. 
The results show that market incomes and (the absolute value of) taxes increase with extended income, 
and social assistance decreases with extended income. National cash transfers increase from the first to 
the second decile, and decrease from the second to the tenth decile. Thus, we find that the national 
welfare system only to a limited degree redistributes incomes to the 10 percent of the population with 
lowest incomes. 
 
Pace Table 10 here 
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 The decile groups with medium extended incomes receive higher average values of 
municipal services and pay slightly more user fees than the lower and the higher decile groups. This 
means that municipal services are neither targeted towards the poor nor towards the rich; it is the 
middle-income groups that receive the highest in-kind benefits. The average value of municipal 
services is 30 percent higher in the fifth decile than in the tenth decile and 18 percent higher than in 
the lowest decile. 
 
Place Table 11 here 
 
 The percent of valued municipal services that originates from different service sectors is 
reported for each decile group in Table 11. In the first decile social care accounts for a relatively high 
share of valued municipal services, which explains the equalizing contribution from social care that 
was found in Table 9. The low value of municipal services in the first, ninth and tenth decile groups in 
Table 10 is mainly due to low benefits from education, childcare and care for the elderly and disabled. 
These three service sectors account for shares of valued services that are first increasing for lower 
decile groups and then decreasing for higher decile groups. This means that the beneficiaries of these 
services, which are the elderly and families with children, account for a relatively high share of the 
middle-income groups. The elderly and families with children are not very prone to earn high 
(equivalent) incomes. Moreover, the welfare system in Norway includes age pensions, child benefits 
and municipal in-kind benefits, which reduce the frequency of low extended incomes among the 
elderly and families with children.10 The fact that the middle-income groups receive higher benefits 
from municipal services is supplementary to the main conclusion that the contribution from municipal 
services to income inequality is neither equalizing nor disequalizing. 
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5. Sensitivity analysis 
 The method for valuation of government output introduced in this paper may be 
considered as a variant of the standard government cost approach. However, while the standard 
approach uses observed public expenditures as a measure of the value of government services, our 
approach aims at accounting for the variation across municipalities in unit costs for producing public 
services. The purpose of this section is to examine whether the empirical results depend on the choice 
of valuation method. Results based on the standard government output approach are displayed in 
Table 12. Note that the methods for allocating the value of in-kind benefits on households/individuals 
including specification of equivalence scale are identical to those used for producing the results in 
Table 7.   
 
Place Table 12 here 
 
 By comparing the results in Tables 7 and 12, we find that the main conclusion of the 
paper is not significantly affected by choice of valuation method. However, this does not mean that 
that the two valuation methods yield identical distributions of extended income. On the contrary, the 
distributions of in-kind benefits across and within regions and municipalities are significantly affected 
by the valuation method, as demonstrated by the results displayed in Table 2. 
6. Conclusion 
 This paper has considered the valuation of local public in-kind transfers and the 
distribution of benefits on families and individuals. In order to estimate the value of in-kind transfers, 
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local government expenditures are adjusted for variation in characteristics that affect unit costs in 
service production. The adjustment method is based on a structural model of local government 
behavior. The central conclusions of the paper are found to be robust to the choice of valuation 
method. 
 The allocation of in-kind benefits on families and individuals for eight different service 
sectors is based on extensive register data systems for Norway, which are combined with household 
survey data and recipient statistics reported by local governments. The value of the production of 
education and childcare is allocated uniformly on the families that receive these services. By contrast, 
the allocation of services like health care and care for the elderly and disabled is justified by an 
insurance benefit approach, which means that potential recipients derive benefits in proportion to their 
probability of becoming a recipient. For instance, the probability of receiving health care and care for 
the elderly is increasing with age, while the probability of receiving social care is decreasing with age. 
 To study interactions between the distributions of local public in-kind benefit and private 
income, we define extended income by private after-tax income plus the value of municipal services. 
Although the inequality in the marginal distribution of municipal services is high, the contribution of 
municipal services to inequality in the distribution of extended income appears to be approximately 
neutral. This result is due to the fact that recipients of major municipal services like primary education 
and care for the elderly are dominating the central part of the distribution of extended income. 
However, the net effect of local government spending and financing is highly equalizing; mainly due 
to the equalizing contribution from municipal income taxes. 
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Appendix 
 This Appendix spells out the detailed methods for selecting recipients and distributing the 
value of services on recipients in different service sectors. 
Administration 
 The value of administration services and user fees are assumed to be distributed 
uniformly on all local residents within each municipality. This assumption is adopted since we have no 
data on the distribution of administration services. 
Education 
 Local governments in Norway are responsible for 10 years of primary education. 
Secondary education is provided by county governments, and is not included in the analysis. The 
value of municipal education services and user fees are assumed to be distributed uniformly on all 
children in the age-group 6-15 years. 
Childcare 
 There are both municipal and private kindergartens in Norway. Since local governments 
subsidize private kindergartens, they are included in the analysis of in-kind transfers. The population is 
ordered in subgroups according to the age of the children, family type and education level of the 
mother in the family (or the father if there is no mother). From summary statistics we know the 
number of children in kindergartens by age and municipality. For information on family type and 
education level we utilize a national survey, which includes 5000 families, where the type of childcare 
is reported for each child. This information is used to estimate the total number of children in 
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kindergartens by family type and education level. Thus we have information on the marginal 
distribution of children in kindergartens by age and municipality, and also the marginal distribution by 
family type and education level. The estimation of the simultaneous distribution by age, family type, 
education level and municipality is based on a log-linear model where the second-order interaction-
component is equal to zero. The model is introduced by Birch (1963), and the maximum likelihood 
estimation method is called "iterative proportional fitting" or "raking". The estimation results show 
that the probability that children are taken care of in a kindergarten increases with the age in the 
interval from 0 to 5 years of age. Furthermore, the probability increases with the education level of the 
mother (father), and children with a lone parent have a higher probability than those with parents who 
live together. These results refer to averages, since the probability also varies across municipalities. 
 The population is divided into subgroups according to the four dimensions age, family 
type, education level and municipality, and from each subgroup the estimated number of children in 
kindergartens are selected by random drawing. Thus the four dimensions above are taken into account 
in the selection of recipients. For each municipality we assume that the assessed value of the childcare 
services is distributed uniformly on the selected recipients. 
 User fees in kindergartens are means tested against family gross income. The distribution 
of user fees is based on a sample of 105 municipalities, which have reported standardized charges for 
three different levels of family gross income. The data is used in a linear regression of charges on 
family income and local government income. The charges are found to increase with family income 
and decrease with local government income. The model is used to predict the charges for all children 
that have been selected as recipients. Thus predictions are made out-of-sample in the sense that 330 
municipalities are not included in the sample. Also the model is simulated with family income as a 
censored continuous variable, while charges are only reported for three different income levels in the 
sample. In the simulations family income is censored from below at 0, and from above at 375 000 
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NOK, which is the highest level of charges reported in the sample. The predictions for each child is 
adjusted for the average rate of price reduction for brothers and sisters, and the predictions are 
calibrated against the sum of user fees reported in the local government accounts. 
Health services 
 County governments or the central government run hospitals in Norway. However, 
general practitioners provide health services that are subsidized by local governments. These 
municipal health services are treated as insurance benefits in the analysis. For information on age and 
gender distribution of the patients we utilize a national survey that includes 5000 families. 
Respondents are asked whether or not they have visited a general practitioner in the last 14 days 
before the interview. This information forms the basis for estimating the age and sex specific 
probability of visiting a physician. The probability is found to increase with age for men, but not for 
women. Thus among younger adults women have a higher probability than men, but among the 
elderly men have a higher probability than women. The value of health care and user fees in each 
municipality is distributed on persons in proportion to their probability of being recipient. 
Social care 
 Local governments provide social assistance, child protection and alcohol abuse 
protection. Since social assistance is defined as cash-transfers to poor families, these transfers are not 
included in our analysis of in-kind transfers. From the income data we know the distribution of social 
assistance on persons and families, but the distribution of expenditures for child protection and alcohol 
abuse protection is not known. However, it is plausible to assume that the distribution of these in-kind 
benefits is similar to the distribution of social assistance. Thus, we have computed the probability of 
receiving social assistance in different income and age groups. The estimate of probability in a given 
subgroup is based on the frequency of social assistance for families within the subgroup. We find that 
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the probability decreases with income and age. This probability is utilized to derive a distribution for 
social services in-kind. Each family receives a share of the value of social services in-kind, which is 
proportional to the probability of receiving social assistance. Consequently child protection and 
alcohol abuse protection are treated as insurance benefits. Everyone receive benefits, but poor families 
receive more than rich families, and elderly people receive less than young adults. We assume that 
families that are in the same income and age group (and in the same municipality) receive equal in-
kind benefits from social services. Recall that we use the equivalence scale parameter a=0 for social 
services, which means that all persons receive the same amount as the family to which they belong. 
User fees are distributed on families according to the same weights as in-kind benefits. 
Care for the elderly and disabled 
 This service sector includes two types of recipients: Those who live at home, and those 
who live in institutions. In the distribution of in-kind transfers we do not separate between the two 
types of clients, since they are not treated separately in the local government accounts. From summary 
statistics we know the number of recipients by age group, sex and municipality. For information on 
family type we utilize a national survey, which includes 5000 families. This information is used to 
estimate the total number of elderly and disabled recipients by family type. Those who live in 
institutions are not included in the survey, so we assume that the patients in nursing homes are 
distributed on family types in proportion to the estimated probabilities of being a recipient of home-
care for a given family type. 
 Thus the available data provide information on the marginal distribution of recipients by 
age, sex and municipality, and also estimates of the marginal distribution by family type. The 
estimation of the simultaneous distribution by age, sex, family type and municipality is based on a log-
linear model where the second-order interaction-component is equal to zero. The estimation results 
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show that the probability of being recipient increases with age, and that the elderly women have a 
higher probability than elderly men. Furthermore, elderly who are single have a higher probability 
than elderly who are married. These results refer to averages, since the probability also varies across 
municipalities. 
 While the selection of recipients in childcare is based on random drawing, we use a 
different procedure in care for the elderly and disabled. Recall that the imputations in care for the 
elderly and disabled is based on a risk-related insurance-benefit approach. First the estimates of the 
number of recipients in subgroups of the population by age, sex, family type and municipality are used 
to derive frequencies of recipients in each subgroup. These frequencies are used as estimates of the 
probability of being a recipient for different subgroups. The value of care for the elderly and disabled 
in each municipality is distributed on persons in proportion to their probability of being recipient. This 
means that all persons receive benefits, but the benefits vary as a function of the characteristics, which 
affect the probability of being a recipient, and also as a function of the economic situation and 
priorities of each local government. 
 User fees in home-care and nursing homes are means tested against family income. 
Unfortunately we have no information on actual prices in nursing homes. Thus, we assume that user 
fees in nursing homes are proportional to user fees in home-care services. User fees in home-care for 
the elderly and disabled have been reported in a sample of 314 municipalities. These data show 
standardized charges for five different income groups, which cover different intervals of family 
taxable income. It is found that charges typically increase as a function of income. To derive estimates 
for all municipalities in Norway, we compute the average charge per month as a function of income 
group. The average charge is weighted by the probability of being recipient, based on estimates of 
probabilities as a function of age, sex, family type and municipality. This weighted average charge 
gives an estimate of the charge for each person, and after aggregation over persons within each 
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municipality; we derive the share of charges paid by each person. Thus, the estimates are calibrated 
against the sum of user fees reported in the local government accounts. 
Culture 
 Municipalities in Norway provide subsidies to cultural activities like sports, arts, 
museums, libraries, cinemas and churches. The frequencies of participation in the different types of 
activities are reported in a national survey, which includes 5000 households. To construct an index of 
demand for culture by different respondents, the rates of participation in different activities are 
weighted by total municipal expenditures for each activity. The respondents are divided in groups 
according to education level (low, medium and high), and the average index of demand is computed 
for each education level. It is found that average demand is increasing with the education level. The 
value of cultural services in each municipality is distributed on persons in proportion to the average 
demand by different education levels. All persons in a given family receive in-kind transfers, which 
are determined by the education level of the person with the highest education level in the family. For 
a given education level and a given municipality the in-kind transfer is constant for all persons. Since 
we have no information on participation in cultural activities on the municipal level, we do not 
account for variation in demand between persons with the same education level. User fees are 
distributed on persons according to the same weights as services. 
Infrastructure 
 Infrastructure services include public roads, housing, water supply, and sewage and 
refuse collection. For these services we assume that in-kind transfers and user fees are distributed 
uniformly on families. Thus, for a given municipality, each family receives the same transfer. Since 
the equivalence scale parameter a=0 for this sector, it follows that all persons in a given municipality 
receive the same benefit. However, there are variations in the individual benefits across municipalities. 
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Table 1. Variables that explain variation in subsistence expenditures by type of variable and 
service sector 
Variable type Variable name Included in sector 
zi1 
Variables affecting 
unit costs 
Index for small municipalities 
Inverse population size 
Person hours (average traveling time) 
Population density 
Sewage purification degree 
Amount of snowfall 
Mentally disabled 7-15 years share of total population 
Mentally disabled 16 years and above share of t. p. 
1, 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 
1 
2, 4 and 6 
2 
8 
8 
2 
6 
zi2 
Variables affecting 
subsistence output 
Population share 0-5 years of age 
Population share 6-15 years of age 
Population share 67-79 years of age 
Population share 80-89 years of age 
Population share 90 years and above 
Children 0-5 years with lone mother/father share of t. p. 
Unemployed 16-59 years share of total population 
Divorced/separated 16-59 years share of t. p. 
3 and 4 
2 
6 
4 and 6 
4 and 6 
3 
5 
5 
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Foreigners from remote cultures share of t. p. 
Dummy for urban municipalities 
Dummy for suburban municipalities 
Index for small municipalities 
Population density 
5 
5 
7 
5 
7 
Sector 1: Administration Sector 3: Childcare  Sector 5: Social services Sector 7: Culture 
Sector 2: Education Sector 4: Health care Sector 6: Care for the Sector 8: Infrastructure  
      elderly and disabled  
 
 
Table 2.  Summary statistics for the ratio between the value of municipal services and observed 
expenditures by municipality size in 1998. Percent 
Municipality size Number of 
municipalities 
Mean Minimum Maximum Standard 
deviation 
Small: 0-4999 residents 245  84.6 66.8 100.2 5.8 
Medium: 5000-19999 residents 150  97.5 71.2 112.8 7.9 
Large: 20000 residents and above 40 105.4 90.8 114.4 3.9 
All municipalities 435  91.0 66.8 114.4 9.9 
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Table 3.  Mean expenditures and mean value of municipal services by service sectors, 1998* 
 Expenditures Valued services 
Service sector Mean 
NOK 
per 
capita 
Percent Minimum
NOK per 
capita 
Maximum
NOK per 
capita 
Mean 
NOK 
per 
capita 
Percent Minimum 
NOK per 
capita  
Maximum
NOK per 
capita  
Administration 2 800 8.6 800 13 300 2 200 7.7 600 11 500 
Education 7 900 26.0 5 100 18 100 7 100 26.1 3 800 16 500 
Childcare 2 500 8.2 700 8 600 2 300 8.3 300 8 200 
Health care 1 500 4.9 100 7 500 1 300 4.6 0 7 000 
Social services 700 2.4 0 2 300 700 2.6 0 2 300 
Care for the 
elderly and 
disabled 
9 500 30.5 2 000 34 600 8 600 30.9 2 200 19 200 
Culture 1 500 4.9 500 8 200 1 500 5.4 500 8 300 
Infrastructure 4 600 14.5 100 37 300 4 100 14.3 0 36 800 
All service 
sectors 
31 000 100.0 19 800 106 800 27 000 100.0 18 100 102 800 
* The means are computed on the basis of the values of 435 municipalities. Thus, it is not accounted for variation 
in population size across municipalities. This fact explains why the overall mean of valued services differs from 
the overall expenditures mean.  
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Table 4. Distribution of different municipal services as a function of individual characteristics 
 Age Sex Family 
type 
Education 
level 
Private 
income 
Administration      
Education x     
Childcare x  x x  
Health Care x x    
Social care x    x 
Care for the elderly and disabled x x x   
Culture    x  
Infrastructure      
 
 
Table 5.  Mean value and Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income by munici-
pality size 
 Small:
0-4999
Medium:
5000-19999 
Large: 20000 
and above 
All 
municipalities
Mean extended income (NOK 1998) 210 100 217 100 229 800 222 800
Gini-coefficient 0.192 0.197 0.236 0.218
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Table 6.  Mean value of (equivalent) after-tax private incomes, municipal in-kind benefits and 
extended income by family type and age, NOK 1998 
Belonging to 
household type 
Age After-tax private 
incomes 
Municipal in-
kind benefits 
Extended 
income 
Single without 
children   
16-66 years 
67-79 years 
80 years and above 
164 800
116 300
90 600
12 200 
47 600 
121 300 
177 000
163 900
211 900
Couple without 
children   
16-66 years 
67-79 years 
80 years and above 
231 600
155 100
123 400
13 400 
20 000 
52 700 
245 000
175 000
176 100
Single with children 
   
0-5 years 
6-15 years 
16-66 years 
122 700
140 800
175 100
29 400 
41 000 
23 600 
152 200
181 800
198 700
Couple with children 
     
0-5 years 
6-15 years 
16-66 years 
195 300
206 700
237 200
22 600 
33 300 
21 700 
217 900
240 000
258 900
All  All 197 000 25 800 222 800
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Table 7.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income with 
respect to components of private incomes and the total value of municipal services 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration coefficient 
Market incomes  1.676  0.970  0.376 
Social assistance -0.012  0.005 -0.502 
National cash transfers -0.131  0.219 -0.130 
Taxes -0.525 -0.309  0.370 
Municipal user fees  0.002 -0.032 -0.014 
Municipal services -0.010  0.147 -0.014 
 
Table 8.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income with 
respect to private incomes after non-municipal taxes and in-kind benefits exclusive of 
municipal income taxes 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration coefficient 
Private incomes subtracted non-
municipal taxes 
 1.139  0.962  0.258 
In-kind benefits subtracted 
municipal income taxes 
-0.139  0.038 -0.789 
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Table 9.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income with 
respect to total private disposable income and municipal service sectors 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration  
coefficient 
Private disposable income  1.010 0.853  0.258 
Administration  0.000 0.009  0.006 
Education  0.008 0.030  0.060 
Childcare  0.000 0.011  0.004 
Health care -0.000 0.005 -0.016 
Social services -0.010 0.008 -0.276 
Care for the elderly and disabled -0.011 0.041 -0.057 
Culture  0.001 0.007  0.042 
Infrastructure  0.001 0.036  0.007 
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Table 10. Decomposition of decile-specific extended income by income components, NOK 1998 
 Market 
incomes
Social 
assistance 
National 
cash 
transfers
Taxes Municipal 
user fees
Municipal 
services 
Extended 
income
1. decile 33 400 4 000 52 400 -12 400 -6 400 30 000 101 000
2. decile 65 000 2 300 76 200 -24 800 -7 100 33 000 144 600
3. decile 109 800 1 600 63 700 -36 200 -7 400 34 000 165 500
4. decile 144 800 1 000 54 800 -45 100 -7 500 34 800 182 900
5. decile 175 300 700 48 800 -53 600 -7 500 35 200 198 900
6. decile 204 800 500 44 600 -62 600 -7 400 35 200 215 000
7. decile 236 500 400 41 300 -73 100 -7 200 34 800 232 800
8. decile 275 800 300 38 500 -86 800 -7 000 33 800 254 700
9. decile 338 300 300 34 300 -109 300 -6 500 30 200 287 300
10. decile 576 200 200 32 500 -184 900 -6 200 27 100 444 900
All deciles 216 000 1 100 48 700 -68 900 -7 000 32 800 222 800
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Table 11.  Value of municipal services by service sector in percent of total value of municipal 
services by deciles of extended income* 
Service sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 All
1. decile 6.3 9.8 5.0 4.0 16.1 27.6 4.7 26.5 100.0
2. decile 5.7 14.9 7.3 3.7 6.8 33.1 4.2 24.1 100.0
3. decile 5.6 19.2 7.8 3.5 5.4 30.4 4.3 23.6 100.0
4. decile 5.4 22.4 8.5 3.4 4.3 28.5 4.3 23.2 100.0
5. decile 5.4 23.7 8.6 3.3 3.7 27.8 4.4 23.0 100.0
6. decile 5.4 24.2 8.7 3.3 3.5 27.3 4.5 23.1 100.0
7. decile 5.5 24.0 8.3 3.3 3.3 27.4 4.6 23.5 100.0
8. decile 5.7 22.5 7.7 3.4 3.3 28.1 4.9 24.4 100.0
9. decile 6.4 20.9 7.1 3.7 3.7 25.3 5.6 27.2 100.0
10. decile 7.2 20.1 6.9 4.1 4.0 20.9 6.6 30.2 100.0
Sector 1: Administration Sector 3: Childcare  Sector 5: Social care Sector 7: Culture 
Sector 2: Education Sector 4: Health care Sector 6: Care for the Sector 8: Infrastructure  
      elderly and disabled 
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Table 12.  Decomposition of the Gini-coefficient for the distribution of extended income with 
respect to components of private incomes and total expenditures on municipal ser-
vices 
 Inequality share Income share Concentration coefficient 
Market incomes  1.681  0.970  0.376 
Social assistance -0.012  0.005 -0.507 
National cash transfers -0.133  0.219 -0.132 
Taxes -0.526 -0.309  0.369 
Municipal user fees  0.002 -0.032 -0.012 
Municipal services -0.012  0.147 -0.018 
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y − α
1Expenditure ui includes wages to local government employees and purchases of goods and services for public 
production. However, expenditure on social services also includes cash transfers (social assistance). Note that 
expenditure  is defined exclusive of interest payments. 
2The major part of local government income in Norway is general grants-in-aid from the central government and 
local income taxes. The tax rate as well as the tax base is determined by the central government. For this reason 
both grants and taxes are treated as exogenous variables in the model. 
3For further discussion of the model and its performance we refer to Aaberge and Langørgen (2003b). 
4The discretionary income ( ) is shown to vary considerably across municipalities, which suggests that 
there is local discretion in spending in many municipalities. 
5As demonstrated by Langørgen and Aaberge (1999), the estimated effects of exogenous variables on spending 
behavior captured by partial regression models may be biased and moreover prove to differ significantly from 
the results obtained when a simultaneous modeling framework is used. Note, however, that a central government 
appointed commission has recently proposed a revised version of the current cost-equalization formula, which 
takes into account the results from the simultaneous model that forms the basis of the present study.  
6The index for small municipalities decreases linearly from 1 to 0 in the interval 0-10000 inhabitants, and equals 
0 for municipalities with more than 10000 inhabitants. 
7The weights are equal to population shares for each municipality. 
8For culture we have estimated the average demand on each education level rather than the probability of being 
recipient. 
9For further details, see Aaberge and Langørgen (2003a). 
10For detailed results on the age composition of different income groups, see Aaberge and Langørgen (2003a). 
